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Newman: Two New York Tax Cases

TWO NEW YORK TAX CASES
Joel S. Newman*
Benjamin Cardozo wrote a number of opinions on New York
State tax issues while he was on the Court of Appeals. I have chosen
two, which might be of interest to a modern tax lawyer. They are
People ex rel. Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist,1 an early transfer pricing
case, and People ex. rel. Clark v. Gilchrist,2 a case involving the
income taxation of stock dividends, when distributed to trust
beneficiaries.
I.

STUDEBAKER
A. Federal Transfer Pricing and Interstate Allocation of
Income

In the late 1950s, Du Pont formed a wholly-owned Swiss sales
subsidiary, DISA, to market elastomers, which were some of its most
profitable products.3 Switzerland was, at the time, a tax haven. Du
Pont’s intention was to shift as much of its profits as possible to the
Swiss subsidiary. The scheme was to have DISA sell the products to
Du Pont at such a high price that DISA would be taxable on 75% of
the profits, leaving only 25% taxable to Du Pont.4 A Du Pont official
actually conceded that “he would have set prices so as to shift 99
*

Professor Emeritus, Wake Forest Law School. A.B. Brown, 1968; J.D. Chicago,
1971. Professor Newman woud like to thank Ralph B. Tower, CPA, Ph. D., for his
help.
1 155 N.E. 68 (N.Y. 1926).
2 153 N.E. 39 (N.Y. 1926).
3 E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
4 Id. at 448. For example, if DISA’s basis per unit of elastomers was zero, and
the retail price per unit was $100, then DISA would sell each unit to Du Pont for
$75. Therefore, of the total profit per unit of $100, DISA would be taxed on $75
(at the low or nonexistent Swiss tax rates), while Du Pont would be taxed on the
remaining $25. In this example, the “transfer price” would have been $75.
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percent of total profits to DISA if he had thought such an allocation
would have survived IRS scrutiny.”5 Du Pont’s scheme failed.6
Du Pont was a relatively early example of a transfer pricing
scheme. These schemes have been the bane of international tax
authorities ever since.7 However, these issues have been around for a
long time in state taxation of multistate enterprises. If an American
corporation does business in multiple states, then there is a huge
incentive to shift corporate income away from a high-tax state to a lowtax or even no-tax state. This issue was faced by the New York Court
of Appeals in the Studebaker case in 1926.
In the 1920s, some states had corporate franchise taxes, but
most did not. The scheme was clear enough:
The fact that only a smattering of states impose such
taxes had encouraged several companies whose
activities were split among taxing and non-taxing states
to set up separate manufacturing and sales corporation,
financially interdependent but legally autonomous, and
so deprive a taxing state of the power to levy upon the
profits thus isolated to one of the processes of a single
business.8
And that is exactly what Studebaker did.
B. Studebaker: The Facts
Studebaker Corporation (“Parent”) was a New Jersey
corporation,9 which manufactured automobiles in Indiana and
Michigan. The early 1920s were the “golden years” for Studebaker.10
In 1921, it broke its own record, selling 66,643 automobiles.11 In 1923,
5

Id. at 448 n.7.
Id. at 448.
7 See I.R.C. § 482 (2017) and accompanying, voluminous regulations.
8 Case Comment, Interstate Allocation of Corporate Income for Taxing Purposes,
40 YALE L. J. 1273 (1931).
9 The company was originally incorporated in Indiana. It was reincorporated in
New Jersey in 1911. THOMAS E. BONSALL, MORE THAN THEY PROMISED: THE
STUDEBAKER STORY (2000).
10 DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, STUDEBAKER: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF AN AMERICAN
CORPORATION 89 (1996).
11 BONSALL, supra note 9, at 113. For more on the Studebaker Corporation and
automobiles, see the Studebaker Museum website, STUDEBAKER NATIONAL
MUSEUM, https://studebakermuseum.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
6
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it reached its highest point, selling 145,167 vehicles.12 It completed its
acquisition of Pierce-Arrow in 1928.13
Parent established sales subsidiaries, including Studebaker
Sales Corporation of Ohio, Studebaker Brothers of Utah, Studebaker
Bros. of California, and Studebaker Corporation of America, a New
Jersey corporation which sold automobiles and automobile accessories
in New York and elsewhere (“NJ Sales”).14 On August 25, 1920,
Parent and NJ Sales executed a sales agreement.15 Parent would sell
NJ Sales automobiles at a discount of 25% off retail price, and
automobile parts at a 33 1/3% discount. NJ Sales would then resell the
automobiles and parts in New York and elsewhere. The discounts,
however, were insufficient to allow NJ Sales to make a profit. In 1920,
it lost $449,133.14, while Parent made a net profit of $11,434,954.41.16
As luck would have it, all of the other sales subsidiaries, except for the
Ohio subsidiary, also lost money in that year.17 In 1921, NJ Sales lost
$2,168,178.63, while Parent made $13,684,952.73.18

The following colloquy occurred at the Tax Commission Hearing:
Commissioner Merrill: The business of the Studebaker Corporation
during the two years in question [1921 and 1922] and at the close of those
two years was the most remunerative that the company ever had, wasn’t
it?
Mr. Gulesian [accountant for Studebaker]: I do not know; there is no
question but what it was remunerative, but whether it was the most
remunerative of their existence I am not prepared to say.

Case on Appeal, Return Exhibit V, at 55, People ex rel Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist,
244 N.Y. 114 (1926) [hereinafter “Hearing”].
12 BONSALL, supra note 9, at 116.
13 BONSALL, supra note 9, at 141.
14 Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 69.
15 Case on Appeal, Return Exhibit VI, People ex rel Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist,
244 N.Y. 114 (1926).
16 Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 69.
17 Id.
18 Id. Recall that, in Du Pont, the taxpayer attempted to shift 75% of the profits to
the Swiss subsidiary. They did not do any more than that, for fear that they wouldn’t
get away with it. Studebaker, by contrast, arranged for most of its sales subsidiaries
to realize a loss. Thus, they were shifting 100% of the profits, and then some. See
supra note 4.
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At a hearing on the New York state tax dispute, Commissioner
Merrill commented:
It is pretty evident from the fact that the Studebaker
Corporation of America [NJ Sales Corporation]
reported the net loss to New York State of $449,133.14,
that the contractural (sic) relation was such that there
could not have been a profit to the Studebaker
Corporation [NJ Sales Corporation] under the
contract?19
Mr. Gulesian, accountant for both parent and NJ Sales Corporation,
answered:
I am not prepared to answer that question; there was a
reduction in retail price in the amount the New York
Company paid for the cars; that may have been due to
overhead or additional selling expenses, advertising or
like reasons.20
The State of New York was unimpressed. It levied a tax on NJ Sales
Corporation of $9,398.66 and $11,936.24, for the two tax years.21 It
arrived at these figures by making an assets to assets comparison:
These figures were arrived at by taking such a
proportion of the combined net income of the parent
corporation and its subsidiaries as the total
determinative assets of those corporations bore to the
determinative assets of those corporations allocated to
the state of New York.22
C. Appellate Division
The Appellate Division sided with the State Tax Commission:
“The question presented is whether our statute under which these taxes
were assessed is sufficiently broad to frustrate this plan, obviously
devised for the purpose of evading this income tax. . . . We think that
it is.”23 Essentially, the Appellate Division found that the August 1920
19

Hearing, supra note 11, at 53.
Hearing, supra note 11, at 53.
21 Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 69.
22 People ex rel. Studebaker Corporation of America v. Gilchrist, 216 N.Y.S. 208,
214 (App. Div. 1926) (Kellogg, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 210.
20
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agreement was unfair, and would not have been reached by parties
dealing with one another at arm’s length. The court’s task, then, was
to “determine the amount of net income which the relator would have
received from its New York business under a fair agreement with its
parent company.”24 Having done so, the burden was on the taxpayer
to show that the tax was incorrectly assessed.25 They failed to meet
this burden. Judge Kellogg dissented, arguing that the assets
comparison accepted by the majority was not a method of allocation
authorized by the statute.26
D. The Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed.27 Judge Cardozo set out the
relevant statute:
Where any corporation liable to taxation under this
article conducts the business whether under agreement
or otherwise in such manner as either directly or
indirectly to benefit the members or stockholders of the
corporation, or any of them, or any person or persons,
directly or indirectly interested in such business by
selling its products or the goods or commodities in
which it deals at less than a fair price which might be
obtained therefor, or where such a corporation, a
substantial portion of whose capital stock is owned
either directly or indirectly by another corporation,
acquires and disposes of the products of the corporation
so owning the substantial portion of its capital stock in
such a manner as to create a loss or improper net
income, the tax commission may require such facts as
it deems necessary for the proper computation provided
by this article, and may for the purpose of the act
determine the amount which shall be deemed to be the
entire net income of the business of such corporation
for the calendar or fiscal year, and in determining such
entire net income the tax commission shall have regard
24
25
26
27

Id. at 212.
Id.
Id. at 213 (Kellogg, J., dissenting).
Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 68.
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to the fair profits which, but for any agreement,
arrangement or understanding, might be or could have
been obtained from dealing in such products, goods or
commodities.28
Cardozo wrote:
We think the inference is permissible that loss would
have been avoided if a contract fair and reasonable in
its terms, such as would naturally have existed between
independent corporations, had been made between
independent corporations, had been made between the
subsidiary as the agent and the parent as the
principal. . . . If the parties had been dealing upon a
normal business footing, the discount would have been
large enough to allow the selling agent a fair or
customary commission upon the sales effected by the
agency. There would have been little difficulty, one
would suppose, in placing evidence in the record from
which a conclusion could be drawn as to the extent of
such commissions and the fair profits that would have
been earned if such commissions had been paid and a
reasonable return allowed on capital invested. Nothing
of the kind was proved.29
Cardozo’s problem was that, under the asset allocation method
used by the court below, all of the income attributable to New York—
not just some of it—was taxable by New York. In effect, 100% of the
New York income was allocated to NJ Sales Corporation. “We find no
basis for a holding that a fair agreement between the parent which
manufactured and the subsidiary which sold would have given the
whole profit to the subsidiary and nothing to the parent.”30 The Court
of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, and the proceeding was,
“remitted to the Commission for the revision of the taxes in accordance
with this opinion.”31
Judge Crane, dissenting, agreed with the court below. Since it
was the taxpayer who created the fictitious loss, all that the Tax
28 Tax Law, as amended by L. 1922, c. 507, § 211 subd. 9, quoted in Studebaker,
155 N.E. at 69.
29 Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 70.
30 Id. at 70-71.
31 Id. at 72.
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Commission could do was to make a reasonable effort at a just
allocation. The burden then shifted to the taxpayer to prove them
wrong.32
Judge Cardozo made it very clear that the Court of Appeals
would have been willing to consider piercing the corporate veil—
disregarding the subsidiary—if the Tax Commission had asked it to.
But the Commission did not ask.
We do not now inquire whether the State of New York
might disregard the subsidiary as a mere cover or
pretense and lay a tax upon the parent as upon a
corporation doing business here through the
instrumentality of an agent. [citations omitted] If this
or something not unlike might have been done, the
Commission has not sought to do it.33
In any event, for Cardozo, the crucial inquiry, had the issue
been raised, would be directed toward the subsidiary’s autonomy.
“Before the ‘corporation persona’ may be ignored, the evidence must
show that ‘the subsidiary is not left with any autonomy.’”34

32

Id. at 73-74 (Crane, J., dissenting).
What were the taxing authorities here in the State of New York
going to do?
***
I know of nothing in the law which prevents the Tax Commission
from adopting this method of allocation in order to determine the
net profits when other information is not forthcoming and it is
conceded that the books do not correctly show the actual facts.
***
What is prescribed, however, is that the Tax Commission must find
what the net profit was or would be, if any, under normal
conditions on such business done in New York State. To arrive at
such a conclusion the Tax Commission could adopt and use any
information it had, and this is specifically stated.
33 Id. at 70.
Cardozo made this comment as part of his ruling that the first
paragraph of subdivision 9 of section 211 did not apply. According to Cardozo, the
first paragraph applied only when the parent and the subsidiary were subject to the
New York franchise tax.
34 Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 71 (citing Learned Hand, J., in Procter & Gamble Co.
v. Newton, 289 F. 1013, 1015 (1923)) (emphasis added). Judge Cardozo’s opinion
was cited for this proposition in Roswell Magill, Allocation of Income by Corporate
Contract, 44 HARV. L. REV. 935, 943 n.41 (1931); and Case Note, What is Unitary
Organization, 41 HARV. L. REV. 227, 231 n.27 (1927).
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Thus, Cardozo was inviting the Tax Commission in subsequent
cases to pierce the corporate veil, as long as it could be shown that the
sales subsidiary had no autonomy. Ultimately, Cardozo was not
rejecting the reallocation; he was simply objecting to the
computational method used by the Commission. Yet, this decision was
clearly a victory for the taxpayer. It was, perhaps, not inappropriate
for commentators to note that, in cases like Studebaker, Cardozo
“joined the conservative wing of the court in decisions favoring
business interests through what appears to be highly formalistic
reasoning.”35
Subsequent early decisions tended to view things Cardozo’s
way—open to a different result in the case of egregious abuse, but
reluctant to find it. In Fox Film Corp. v. Loughman,36 responding to
the Commission’s argument that the corporate arrangement was a
subterfuge, the court responded:
This contention is not tenable, for the evidence does not
establish any misrepresentation or suppression as to
facts. There is nothing fictitious as to the apparent
situation; the status is one created pursuant to and
authorized by law, and the realty corporation must be
recognized as a separate legal entity distinction from
that of the petitioner.37
Similarly, in Wisconsin, the court refused to reallocate income.
Cardozo’s opinion in Studebaker was quoted at length.38
Yet, in a much more recent New York case, income was
reallocated. However, in that case, there was a finding that no separate
autonomy existed. Therefore, the precise condition stated by Cardozo
for piercing the corporate veil had been met.39
35

Mark Gergen & Kevin Quinn, Common Law Judicial Decision Making: The
Case of the New York Court of Appeals 1900-1941, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 897, 966
(2012).
36 251 N.Y.S. 693 (App. Div. 1931).
37 Id. at 696 (citing Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 68).
38 Curtis Companies, Inc. v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 251 N.W. 497, 501 (Wis.
1933).
39
Wurlitzer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 42 A.D.2d 247 (App. Div. 1973), aff’d,
315 N.E.2d 805 (N.Y. 1974):
The key finding made by the Commission, which is dispositive of
the case, is that WAC had no separate corporate autonomy and
was, in reality, merely the finance department of a unitary

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/18

8

Newman: Two New York Tax Cases

2018

TWO NEW YORK TAX CASES

309

What is curious about the Studebaker decision is the method of
allocation. To an international tax lawyer, the facts screamed out for
transfer price analysis. To consider just the automobiles, NJ Sales’
discount was 25%. For example, if the retail price of an automobile
had been $100, then Parent would have sold it to NJ Sales for $75.
From the perspective of NJ Sales, the resale transaction would be:
Retail Price
--Basis[“transfer price”]
--NJ Sales expenses per unit

$100
$75
[$25+]

(loss)40
The question should have been whether the transfer price of $75 was
too high.
In a modern international tax case, the resale price method
would be the most likely method of determining the transfer price.
The resale price method evaluates whether the amount
charged in a controlled transaction is arm’s length by
reference to the gross profit margin realized in
comparable uncontrolled transactions. The resale price
method is . . . ordinarily used in cases involving the
purchase and resale of tangible property in which the
reseller has not added substantial value to the tangible
goods by physically altering the goods before resale.41
When Cardozo sought to know the “fair or customary commission
upon the sales effected by the agency,”42 he was seeking to know
precisely what the gross profit margin would have been, had Parent
business, Wurlitzer. WAC had no separate directors, officers or
employees—all these positions were held by Wurlitzer personnel
in addition to their regular duties; Wurlitzer personnel performed
all of WAC’s business activity; WAC owned no separate real or
tangible personal property. Thus, it is quite clear that, except for
the fiction of a separate corporate shell, WAC is the same as the
other unincorporated divisions of Wurlitzer; it, therefore, is for all
intent and purposes the sixth division of the company.
Wurlitzer Co., 42 A.D.2d at 250-51.
40 Note that transfer pricing can shift income in either direction. In Studebaker,
the income was shifted to the parent, while in Du Pont, the income was shifted to the
subsidiary.
41 26 C.F.R. § 1.482(3)(c)(1) (2018). To compute the transfer price, reduce the
retail price by the gross profit margin.
42 Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 70.
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and NJ Sales dealt with one another at arm’s length. That is the resale
price method. This information, to the frustration of both Cardozo and
the Appellate Division, was not provided by the taxpayer.
The court below, having raised the transfer pricing issue,
despaired of answering it. Instead, they simply made an allocation of
profits by comparing New York assets with world-wide assets.43
The Appellate Division was using what is now called the formulary
apportionment method. Although the Appellate Division only
compared assets to assets, the modern formulary apportionment
method uses a weighted average of factors—usually including sales,
payroll, and property, in order to allocate the worldwide income to
each of the taxing jurisdictions. This method, rejected in Studebaker,
has since become the predominant method of allocating income among
the states of the United States, even in New York.44
Studebaker represents an early transfer pricing case, one in
which a transfer pricing analysis might have been more easily applied
than the formulary apportionment used by the Tax Commission and
the Appellate Division. Judge Cardozo’s opinion was typical of
other pro-business opinions of the time. Curiously, the formulary
apportionment which was so troubling for Cardozo has now won the
day in state taxation.
II.

CLARK
A. Stock Dividends as Taxable Income; Stock Dividends
as Fiduciary Accounting Income

When one thinks of dividends, one usually thinks of cash
dividends. The corporation distributes some of its earnings and profits
to its shareholders in cash—so many dollars per share. But then there
are stock dividends. Instead of distributing cash, the corporation
43

Id. at 73 (Crane, J., dissenting). See also Studebaker, 216 N.Y.S. at 210.
Matter of Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 10
N.Y.3d 392 (2008). See N.Y. TAX LAW § 210-A (Franchise Tax on Business
Corporations: Apportionment). See also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board
of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994). In theory, either transfer pricing or formulary
apportionment should work equally well. In practice, formulary apportionment
works less well in the international context, because such factors as payroll and
property values can be so starkly different in first and third world countries. There
are, admittedly, differences in payroll and property values in the various states of the
United States, but they are not so extreme.
44
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distributes its own stock. For example, the corporation distributes one
share of its own stock, for each ten shares already owned by the
shareholder.
Are dividends income? With cash dividends, the answer is
easy. Of course they are.45 However, with stock dividends, the answer
is more complex. With a cash dividend, the shareholder can spend the
cash, immediately. With stock dividends, in order to realize the benefit
of the dividend, the shareholder must first sell the extra stock, and then
spend it. So, are stock dividends immediately income, or are they more
like unrealized appreciation, taxable only upon a later realization
event?
But wait. There’s more. Income has different meanings for
different purposes. First, there is tax. One cannot have an income tax
unless one knows what income is. A receipt is taxable income only if
that receipt was income in the first place. Are stock dividends taxable
income?
Then there is fiduciary accounting. What is income, and what
is principal, for fiduciary accounting purposes? Imagine a trust which
provides that income is payable annually to the Income Beneficiary
(“IB”) for life, with the remainder payable upon IB’s death to the
Remainderman (“R”). This year, the trust receives some payments.
The Trustee, in order to administer the trust properly, must determine
which of those payments are income, and which are principal. Income
payments, such as interest and rent,46 should be distributed this year
to IB. In contrast, principal payments, such as most sales proceeds,47
must be accumulated, to be paid out to R upon the death of IB.
Are stock dividends income, or principal?
1. Stock Dividends as Taxable Income
The tax question came up in the United States Supreme Court
in the famous case of Eisner v. Macomber.48 Mrs. Macomber owned
shares in Standard Oil of California.49 She received a dividend of one
share of stock for every two shares already owned.50 Although the
45
46
47
48
49
50

See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (2017).
Uniform Principal and Income Act, § 401(b) (1997).
Uniform Principal and Income Act, § 404(2) (1997).
Eisner v. Macomber, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920).
Id. at 191.
Id.
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1913 tax law did not mention stock dividends, the 1916 tax
statute specifically provided that they were taxable income.51 Mrs.
Macomber argued that it was unconstitutional to tax her stock
dividends as income.52 The Court agreed, in a five to four decision. It
held that stock dividends were not income.53 Therefore, if they were
to be taxed, they could not be taxed under the Sixteenth Amendment.
They could only be taxed under Article I, Section 8, in which case, the
tax would have to be apportioned among the states. The essence of
income, according to the majority opinion, was that it must be derived
from capital, and separated from that capital.54 There was no such
separation in the form of a stock dividend.
Eisner v. Macomber was very big news in 1920. A significant
amount of federal tax revenue was at stake. The financial markets were
in disarray for months before the decision was announced, because no
one knew how stock dividends would be treated for tax purposes.55
As it turned out, Eisner v. Macomber, though still famous, is no longer
good law. The Supreme Court came up with a much more workable
definition of income in Glenshaw Glass,56 and the taxability of stock
dividends is now addressed in I.R.C. § 305, in all of its complexity.
But Macomber’s case was a very big deal at the time.
2. Stock Dividends as Fiduciary Accounting Income
The fiduciary accounting question has its own complications.
The share of stock is the principal—the asset which generates the
income. The dividend on that stock, if in cash, is clearly income
generated by that principal. However, a stock dividend—perhaps
splitting one share of stock into two shares—would appear to be a mere
reconstitution of the principal stock. It is hard to see how a splitting of
the principal into smaller pieces can turn that principal into income.
Yet, at the time of the stock dividend in Clark, New York
followed the “Pennsylvania Rule.”57 Under that formulation, stock
51

Id.
Id.
53 Macomber, 40 S. Ct. at 195.
54 Id.
55 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The Continuing Legacy of
Realization, in PAUL CARON, TAX STORIES 93 (2d ed., 2009).
56 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass. Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
57 Jesse Raymond, Trusts—Division of Extraordinary Dividends Between Cestuis
For Life and In Remainder, 10 TEX. L. REV. 75, 82 n.22 (1931).
52

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/18

12

Newman: Two New York Tax Cases

2018

TWO NEW YORK TAX CASES

313

dividends were treated as income, but only if payable from the
accumulated earnings of the corporation. Otherwise, they were treated
as principal, and accumulated for the benefit of the R. In this way, the
integrity of the corpus was preserved.58
Assume that a corporation has earnings. If it pays them out as
cash dividends this year, they should be fiduciary accounting income,
payable to IB. If the corporation accumulates those earnings and pays
them out in some subsequent year, should they not still be income? In
fact, shouldn’t they be fiduciary accounting income whether they are
paid out as cash dividends or stock dividends? That was the position
taken by the Pennsylvania Rule. Pursuant to this Rule, it can often be
the case that stock dividends are principal for fiduciary accounting
purposes but income for tax purposes.
So, in 1926, stock dividends were not taxable income under the
federal income tax, pursuant to Eisner v. Macomber. They were,
however, sometimes fiduciary accounting income, pursuant to the
Pennsylvania Rule, then adopted in New York. These two notions
came together in Clark.
B. The Case: Facts
Alfred Corning Clark’s father was the partner of Isaac Singer,
of the Singer Sewing Machine Company.59 Alfred Corning Clark put
a substantial amount of the stock of the Singer Sewing Machine
Company in trust, for his son, Robert Sterling Clark, for life.60 In 1920,
the Singer Sewing Machine Company declared a stock dividend. As a
result, 10,642 shares of Singer Stock were payable to the Trust.61 The
Trustees duly distributed those shares to Robert Sterling Clark, the life
tenant.62 The issue was the taxability of those shares.

58

Case Note, Interpretation of Deed of Trust: Distinction between stock dividends
and dividends of stock, 43 YALE L.J. 1181 (1934); Case Note, Conflicting Claims of
Life Tenant and Remainderman to “All Stock—No Cash” Dividends, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 298 (1932); Raymond, supra note 57.
59 See generally NICHOLAS W EBER, THE CLARKS OF COOPERSTOWN:
THEIR
SINGER SEWING MACHINE FORTUNE, THEIR GREAT AND INFLUENTIAL ART
COLLECTIONS (2007).
60 People ex rel Clark v. Gilchrist, 153 N.E. 39, 39 (N.Y. 1926).
61 Id.
62 Id.
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C. Authorities
The Macomber case was cited both by the Appellate Division
and the Court of Appeals. In the Court of Appeals, Judge Cardozo
commented: “The Income Tax Law of New York is framed upon the
model of the Federal Income Tax Act, though the two differ in some
particulars. The correspondence is so close, however, that decisions
under the Federal Act are important aids to the construction of the
statute of the State.”63 Recall that Macomber held that stock dividends
were not income.64
There was also the Opinion of the New York Attorney General,
which stated that stock dividends, subject to exceptions not relevant to
this case, were not income.65 This Attorney General’s opinion was
accepted by Article 61 of the state regulations.66 These regulations had
remained in place unchallenged for some years. Things looked good
for the taxpayer.
There was, however, the statute. Section 359 of the New York
tax law (the “1919 Statute”) stated that dividends were taxable.67
Subdivision 8 of Section 359 went on to say that stock dividends were
dividends.68
D. The Appellate Division
For the Appellate Division, the statute was enough. The
Macomber ruling was crucially important under federal law, when the
63

Id.
Macomber, 40 S. Ct. at 195. Charles Evans Hughes had a curious and continuing
relationship with these cases. He wrote the opinion in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S.
418 (1918), which paved the way for the Macomber decision. After resigning from
the Supreme Court in order to run for President, he represented the taxpayer in
Macomber. Kornhauser, supra note 55, at 100. When Clark was argued in the New
York Court of Appeals, Hughes joined in an amicus brief. Br. of Murray, Aldrich &
Roberts and Hughes, Rounds, Schurman & Dwight, as Amici Curiae, from records
and briefs for People ex rel. Clark v Gilchrist. Not surprisingly, Hughes would have
liked the New York Court of Appeals to have shown even more deference to
Macomber. The brief quoted the opinion of Hughes, J., in Towne v. Eisner.
65 Clark, 153 N.E. at 40.
66 Id.
67 Laws 1919, c. 627, § 359 subd. 1, cited in People ex rel Clark v. Gilchrist, 211
N.Y.S. 679, 679 (App. Div. 1925).
68 Laws 1919, c. 627, § 359 subd. 8, cited in People ex rel Clark v. Gilchrist, 211
N.Y.S. 679, 679 (App. Div. 1925).
64
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applicability of the Sixteenth Amendment was in play. But there was
no counterpart to the Sixteenth Amendment in New York. Perhaps,
said the Appellate Division, the use of the word “income” was a
“misnomer” when applied to stock dividends.69 But it did not matter,
because the New York State taxing power was not limited to income.
The New York legislature had explicitly stated that stock dividends
were taxable, and so they were. The State Tax Commission argued
that the court should distinguish the case of stock dividends received
by shareholders, and stock dividends received by trust beneficiaries.
However, the Appellate Division pointed out that there was no such
distinction in the statute. The taxpayer lost.70
E. The Court of Appeals
On appeal, Judge Cardozo also paid homage to the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Macomber, but again pointed out that
Macomber, with its constitutional dimension, was distinguishable.
When the issue came before the Court of Appeals, however, there were
new state statutes in play. In 1926, the New York State legislature,
presumably reacting to the Appellate Division decision in Clark,
passed a new tax statute, retroactive to January 1, 1919 (the “1926
Statute”).71 For the purpose of the new statute, “stock dividends” were
“new stock issued, for surplus or profits capitalized, to shareholders in
proportion to their previous holdings.”72 Such stock dividends were,
pursuant to the 1926 Statute, not taxable to the recipient until the
corporation redeemed or cancelled them, or the shareholder sold
them.73
Also, the 1926 Legislature amended the state Personal Property
Law, providing that “under any will or deed hereafter made, unless
69

Clark, 211 N.Y.S. at 681.
Id. at 682.
71 Judge Cardozo ruled that there was no constitutional problem with the
retroactivity of the 1926 Statute. Clark, 153 N.E. at 42.
72 L. 1926, ch. 543, § 1.
73 L. 1926, ch. 543, § 2, quoted in Clark, 153 N.E. at 41:
70

Stock dividends when received by a shareholder shall not be subject to tax
but if before or after the distribution of any such dividend the corporation
proceeds to cancel or redeem its stock at such time and in such manner as
to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part
essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount
so distributed in redemption or cancellation of the stock shall be treated as
a taxable dividend and included in gross income.
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otherwise therein provided, stock dividends shall be principal and not
income of a trust.”74 Thus, the 1926 Legislature prospectively
abandoned the Pennsylvania Rule.
The Attorney General again argued that the new statute should
not apply when the stock dividend was paid to a trust beneficiary,
rather than directly to a shareholder—especially when the stock
dividends were actually paid to the life beneficiary, and hence, treated
by the Trustee as income.75 Again, no such distinction had been raised
in the new statute.
In fact, the Legislature had considered making such a
distinction in 1926, but rejected it. An earlier draft of the bill contained
the following: “Where a stock dividend is received by a fiduciary
shareholder, and is paid under a will, deed of trust, or other agreement,
to a beneficiary taxable under this article, it shall constitute taxable
income and be included by the beneficiary in gross income for the year
of its receipt.”76 This language was dropped from the legislation as
enacted.77
Judge Cardozo also took note of the change in the Personal
Property Law. In his view, the Pennsylvania Rule had been
appropriately rejected because:
The rule previously applied had resulted in so
many complications and obscurities as to be
almost unworkable in practice. It involved elaborate
accountings for the purpose of determining how far
the dividends were the result of profits accumulated
before the creation of the trust, and how far the result
of profits accumulated thereafter. The Legislature
evinced its will that there should be an end to these
complexities hereafter in the administration of the
law of trusts. It had no thought of keeping them alive
in the administration of the Tax Law.78
74

L. 192, Pers. Prop. Law, § 17-a, cited in Clark, 153 N.E. at 41.
Clark, 153 N.E. at 41.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. (internal citations omitted). Cardozo’s linking of the two 1926 changes might
suggest that he thought that the change to the Personal Property Law, as well as the
change to the tax laws, was retroactive. The change to the Personal Property Law
was not retroactive. In Pratt v. Ladd, 253 N.Y. 213 (1930), a unanimous decision
joined by Judge Cardozo, the Pennsylvania Rule was applied to a stock dividend paid
75
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Judge Cardozo had other administrative concerns as well.
Recall that, pursuant to the Opinion of the Attorney General and the
ensuing regulation, many recipients of stock dividends had omitted
those receipts from their state tax returns. Holding now that such stock
dividends should have been taxable would create an administrative
nightmare:
There existed a situation fraught with opportunities for
confusion and injustice. Returns had been made in
reasonable reliance on the Comptroller’s regulation. If
there had been mistake, it was mistake induced by
agents of the State itself. Taxpayers thus misled had
regulated their affairs on the assumption that their tax
accounts were closed. To reaudit returns so made might
impose a grievous burden.79
Furthermore, Judge Cardozo pointed out that the taxation of the stock
dividends was not being exempted, but merely deferred, until such
time as the stock was cancelled, redeemed, or sold. For Cardozo, the
1926 Statute was clear. The Appellate Division was reversed, and the
taxpayer prevailed.80
F. Who Was Right?
Both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals were
right in their ultimate holdings. They reached opposite results, but the
statute had changed in the meantime. Perhaps, then, a more
appropriate question would be which legislation was better—the 1919
Statute, or the 1926 Statute?

in 1925—despite the abandonment of the Pennsylvania Rule in 1926. See also
Raymond, supra note 57, at 82 n.22 (“Trusts established prior to its [the 1926
abandonment of the Pennsylvania Rule] enactment are apparently still governed by
the Osborne case [the Pennsylvania Rule].”).
79 Clark, 153 N.E. at 42.
80 Id. at 43. Cardozo’s Clark opinion has stood the test of time rather well. It is
cited perhaps more often to support the notion that the state legislature can enact
retroactive tax laws without violating constitutional norms. Yeaton v. Levitt,
244 N.Y.S.2d 334 (App. Div. 1963). The ruling applies to “extraordinary stock
dividends.” In re Villard’s Will, 147 Misc. 472, 474 (Surr. Ct. Westchester Cty. N.Y.
1933); Attorney General Jacob Javits, under somewhat different facts, wrote
approvingly of Cardozo’s opinion in a 1955 Attorney General’s Opinion. 1955 Op.
Atty Gen. No. 237.
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Both statutes ignored the distinction between shareholder and
trust beneficiary. Ironically, when the statute favored the government
in the Appellate Division, the taxpayer argued that the statute should
not apply to trust beneficiaries. Yet, when the revised statute favored
the taxpayer in the Court of Appeals, it was the government making
that argument.
Both courts rejected the argument. Both courts were correct,
in that neither statute recognized the distinction between shareholder
and beneficiary. The Court of Appeals was on even firmer ground,
since the legislature by that time had considered recognizing the
distinction, but rejected it. Were the two legislatures correct in
ignoring this distinction?
The fact that the recipient of the dividend was a trust
beneficiary rather than a mere shareholder did indeed make a
difference. For the shareholder, both cash dividends and stock
dividends benefited the same recipient—the shareholder. However,
for trust beneficiaries, they might not have done so. Cash dividends
were clearly fiduciary accounting income, and therefore payable when
received to IB. However, under the Pennsylvania Rule in place in New
York at the time, stock dividends might have been fiduciary
accounting income, payable to IB, or they might have been fiduciary
accounting principal, payable to R.
Moreover, there was a timing difference. Cash dividends,
whether payable to a shareholder or a trust beneficiary, were payable
to IB when declared and paid by the corporation. However, stock
dividends, under the Pennsylvania Rule, might have been payable to
IB when declared and paid by the corporation, or, perhaps, they were
not to be beneficially enjoyed until the expiration of the income
interest. And yet, both statutes treated all cash dividends the same, and
all stock dividends the same.
Once the Pennsylvania Rule was abandoned, the 1926 Statute
made sense.81 Both the complexities of the taxation, and fiduciary
accounting, were removed. Perhaps fairness in all possible situations
was not achieved, but administrability was. Now, things are even
clearer, for the State of New York has abandoned its own, separate
income tax entirely, in favor of bootstrapping itself to the provisions

81

The Pennsylvania Rule has since been abandoned in most states. NORMAN LANE
& HOWARD ZARITSKY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND TRUSTS ¶ 3.04
(1988).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/18

18

Newman: Two New York Tax Cases

2018

TWO NEW YORK TAX CASES

319

of the federal tax. Now, at least, there is only one level of complexity,
not two.82
One cannot blame either the Appellate Division or the Court of
Appeals for failing to achieve a fairer result in light of the difficulties
caused by the differences between cash dividends and stock dividends,
tax accounting and fiduciary accounting, and shareholders and trust
beneficiaries. The two courts merely applied the statutes as they were
written. One might have wished that the New York State legislature,
both in 1919 and 1926, had been more keenly aware of the
complexities it faced. Yet, by abandoning the Pennsylvania Rule, and
eventually abandoning even a separate New York State income tax
system, the New York State legislature ultimately came up with
something that works reasonably well.
III.

CONCLUSION

One could design an entire three-year law school curriculum
exclusively around Cardozo opinions.

82

N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 607, 611 (McKinney 2018). For federal tax treatment, see
I.R.C. § 643(a)(4) (2017). Good luck.
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